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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2003, the United States Supreme Court decided its first
cases to address affirmative action in higher education admissions since the
Court's decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.' In a
pair of cases concerning the University of Michigan,2 the Court took up the
issue of voluntary affirmative action in admissions by a public university.
In Gratz the Court struck down the affirmative action plan adopted by the
University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science and Arts, while in
Grutter the court approved the affirmative action plan adopted by the
University of Michigan Law School. The complementary holdings of these
two cases provide guidance to institutions of higher education on the
permissible contours of affirmative action in admissions, but do the Gratz
and Grutter opinions shed any light on affirmative action in employment,
particularly in private employment?
To answer this question, this casenote first briefly reviews the Court's
decision in Bakke and how it influenced the parameters of affirmative
action in employment. An examination of the experience under Bakke
shows that it had a discernible effect on the law governing affirmative
action in employment. The casenote then addresses the rationale
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1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411
(2003).
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underlying the Grutter decision, which approved the law school's
affirmative action plan, and examines whether that rationale is amenable to
transference to employment law jurisprudence in light of the Bakke
experience. The casenote concludes that although Grutter may have laid
the foundation for a more expansive use of affirmative action in
employment, particularly public employment, the paradigm currently used
to examine the use of affirmative action in private employment may
prevent Grutter from greatly affecting affirmative action in private
employment in the near future.
II. BAKKE
In Bakke, the Medical School of the University of California at Davis
had adopted an affirmative action program which, in the relevant years, set
aside sixteen places in its entering class for minority applicants.3 The
medical school rejected Allan Bakke's application in two successive years,
while in each of those years admitting minority applicants whose grade
point averages and MCAT scores were lower than Bakke' s. In the first
year he applied, the medical school left four of the set aside slots unfilled.5
After his second rejection, Bakke sued the medical school alleging a
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Powell wrote an opinion in which he concluded that the
school's First Amendment right to academic freedom was a countervailing
constitutional interest to be weighed against Bakke's Equal Protection
claim:
Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to
select those students who will contribute the most to the "robust
exchange of ideas," petitioner invokes a countervailing
constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment. In this light,
petitioner must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of
paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission.6
Having found that the medical school had a compelling interest in
promoting a diverse student body, Justice Powell then turned to the issue of
whether the school's affirmative action program was a necessary means to
promoting that end. Because the program focused exclusively on ethnic
3. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.
4. See id. at 277 n.7.
5. See id. at 276.
6. Id. at 313; see also id. at 312 ("Academic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment. The freedom of the university to make its own judgments as to education
includes the selection of its student body.").
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diversity and set aside a fixed number of places in each class, Justice
Powell concluded that the plan did not pass constitutional muster.7 He
explained that "[t]he fatal flaw in petitioner's preferential program is its
disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment."
8
Four Justices agreed with Justice Powell's conclusion that race
conscious admissions are permissible under the Constitution, 9 although the
rationale of this plurality was based on the Fourteenth, not the First,
Amendment.1° These four Justices agreed with Justice Powell that race
could be used as a "plus" factor in decision making." Four other Justices
agreed with Justice Powell's conclusion that the affirmative action program
at issue did not pass constitutional or statutory muster because race was the
decisive factor in rejecting Bakke's application: "Race cannot be the basis
of excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program. ' 2
Parsing the decisions in Grutter, Justice O'Connor concluded: "The only
holding of the Court in Bakke was that a 'State has a substantial interest
that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program
involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin."" 3
The effect of Bakke on employment law in the private sector may be
properly subject to question. The Equal Protection Clause, under current
law, cannot be read in pari materia with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.14 The differing levels of scrutiny utilized under the Equal Protection
Clause to determine whether discrimination has taken place do not comport
with Title VII's blanket prohibition against discrimination "because of...
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" which applies the same level
of scrutiny to each classification. 5 In addition, Bakke lacked a clear
majority rationale for its outcomes, which would tend to undermine the
persuasiveness of any reliance on it. That being said, it is clear that Bakke
did have an effect on Title VII jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court decided eight affirmative action cases between
1978, when it decided Bakke, 16 and 1989, when it decided City of
7. See id. at 315-16.
8. Id. at 320.
9. See id. at 325-26.
10. See id. at 329.
11. See id. 326, 273 n. 1.
12. Id. at 418.
13. 123 S. Ct. at 2336 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320).
14. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 628 n.6 (1987).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994); cf Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting the differing standards between the constitutional and
statutory analysis); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979)
(construing Title VI of the Civil Rights as being coextensive with the Equal Protection
Clause and concluding that "Title VII and Title VI ... cannot be read in pari materia.").
16. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United
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Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 7 In seven out of the eight, some element of
Bakke was relied upon by at least one opinion writer." Despite the lack of
a clear majority, and the fact that it dealt with admissions in higher
education and not employment, it can be safely said that Bakke became the
logical foundation to the development of the Supreme Court's approach to
affirmative action in employment. This can be seen in cases such as
Weber, Wygant and Johnson.
In Weber, the Court was presented with a Title VII challenge to an
affirmative action plan incorporated in a collective bargaining agreement.
The plan was intended to "eliminate manifest racial imbalances in
traditionally segregated job categories" by reserving fifty percent of the
openings in the facility's craft-training program for African-Americans
until the percentage of African-American skilled workers equaled the
percentage of African-Americans in the local labor force.' 9 A majority of
the Court approved this affirmative action plan because its purposes
mirrored "those of the statute" and it did "not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of white employees. 20 In concurrence, Justice Blackmun noted
that the plan at issue comported with the dictates of Bakke because it
operated "as a temporary tool for remedying past discrimination without
attempting to 'maintain' a previously achieved balance. 21  The Weber
Court has been characterized as adopting "the Bakke plurality's position
that traditional racial classifications are distinct from benign racial
classifications and thus warrant a modified form of inquiry.2
In Wygant, a collective bargaining agreement between a teachers'
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986); Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
17. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Croson is significant in that it was the first time that a
majority of the Supreme Court had ever joined in one opinion addressing the
constitutionality of governmental affirmative action programs and adopted the "strict
scrutiny" standard. See Michael Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and
the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1731 (1989); cf
Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989). For a review of the treatment of Bakke in
construction contract "set aside" cases, see Akjil Reed Amar and Neal Kumar Katyal,
Symposium on Affirmative Action: Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1745 (1996).
18. The only exception being Local 93. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
19. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
20. Id. at 208.
21. Id. at 216 (Blackmun, J. concurring) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 342 n.17); see In re
Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1499 (11th Cir.
1987) ("The Court concluded that 'the Plan thus resembles the "Harvard Plan" approvingly
noted by Justice Powell in [Bakke]."').
22. Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1173 (6th Cir. 1994).
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union and a school board required the school board, in the event of a
reduction in force, to maintain the then current percentage of minority
teachers on the faculty. 2' During a subsequent reduction in force, this
provision would have required the layoff of tenured non-minority teachers
and the retention of untenured minority teachers. After the school board
refused to follow the terms of the labor contract, the union and one of the
laid off minority teachers sued to require the school board to adhere to the
layoff provision, and prevailed in state court.25 Consequently, non-
minority tenured teachers were laid off while untenured minority teachers
were retained. The non-minority tenured teachers then brought a claim
under the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, and Section 1983 claiming
21that the termination of their employment was discriminatory.
The Court issued five opinions. Justice Powell wrote the judgment of
the Court in which two Justices concurred entirely and Justice O'Connor
concurred, except for its discussion of the effect of layoffs, as contrasted
28with hiring goals, on the legal analysis. Wygant rejected the argument
that a public school could utilize affirmative action in employment in order
to provide appropriate role models for minority students.29 In Wygant,
Justices Powell and O'Connor relied on Bakke to support the principle that
racial classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny even if those
classifications favor a minority group.3 ° In addition, Justice O'Connor
relied on Bakke for the proposition that racial diversity may be a
compelling government interest,
31 but that societal discrimination is not.
3
1
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent which seems to foreshadow the rationale
subsequently adopted by the Court in Grutter, discussed below:
[I]t is quite obvious that a school board may reasonably conclude
that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the
student body that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly
all-white, faculty. For one of the most important lessons that the
American public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural,
and national backgrounds that have been brought together in our
23. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270.
24. See id. at 271-72.
25. See id.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) (amended 2004).
27. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272.
28. See id. at 282-83 ("Though hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals,
they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. Denial of a future
employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job.").
29. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76; id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
30. See id. at 273, 285.
31. See id. at 286; see also id. at 301 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Bakke for the
proposition that race may be a permissible factor in governmental decision making).
32. See id. at 288.
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famous 'melting pot' do not identify essential differences ......
Like Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor seemed inclined to consider that
diversity on a faculty could constitute a compelling state interest justifying
an affirmative action plan.34
Finally, Johnson concerned an affirmative action plan adopted by
Santa Clara County. The plan, intended to increase both minority and
female hiring, did not set aside a specific number of positions for either.
Rather, the plan "authorized the consideration of ethnicity or sex as a factor
when evaluating qualified candidates for jobs in which members of such
groups were poorly represented., 35 Johnson, a male, was rejected for
promotion in favor of a woman. He sued, alleging that the application of
the plan to the promotion decision violated his rights under Title VII.36 The
Court concluded that the plan did not violate the statute. Looking to
Weber, the Court first determined that the plan had a permissible purpose
because it sought to rectify historical discrimination.37 The Court then
determined that the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of the
majority, by relying on Bakke for the proposition that an affirmative action
plan that merely provides a "plus" but does not insulate an applicant from
competition with others, is permissible under the statute.38
Consequently, Bakke can be seen as establishing, in broad terms, the
parameters of permissible affirmative action programs in both admissions
and employment. As noted by Judge Easterbrook:
Wygant and Johnson follow up on the approach taken by Justice
Powell, whose separate opinion in [Bakke] concluded that under
an affirmative action plan race or sex may be a factor in a hiring
decision but can not be dispositive-not, at least, unless the plan
is designed to overcome the effects of past discrimination.39
The effect of Bakke can be seen in both the level of scrutiny applied to
affirmative action plans and the manner in which a plan is tested for being
"narrowly tailored." This experience with Bakke indicates that Grutter
should be expected to have some cognizable impact on the jurisprudence of
affirmative action in employment.
However, the differences between Title VII and the Equal Protection
Clause did limit Bakke's impact on employment. In construing Title VII,
the courts of appeals distinguished the underlying First Amendment/
academic freedom concern expressed in Bakke from those considerations
33. Id. at 315.
34. Id. at 288 n*.
35. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 622.
36. Id. at 619.
37. Id. at631.
38. Id. at 638.
39. Hill v. Ross, 183 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 1999).
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generally found in the American workplace. For example, in Taxman v.
Board of Education, 40 the Third Circuit concluded:
We are also unpersuaded by the Board's contention that Equal
Protection cases arising in an education context support
upholding the Board's purpose in a Title VII action. These Equal
Protection cases, unlike the case at hand, involved corrective
efforts to confront racial segregation or chronic minority
underrepresentation in the schools. In this context, we are not at
all surprised that the goal of diversity was raised. While we
wholeheartedly endorse any statements in these cases extolling
the educational value of exposing students to persons of diverse
races and backgrounds, given the framework in which they were
made, we cannot accept them as authority for the conclusion that
the Board's non-remedial racial diversity 4oal is a permissible
basis for affirmative action under Title VII.
As discussed below, whether Grutter's central holding will be limited to
the realm of higher education, as was Justice Powell's First
Amendment/academic freedom analysis in Bakke, is subject to question.
III. GRATZAND GRU7TER
In light of the precedent concerning affirmative action, Gratz v.
Bollinger is a relatively straight forward case. In Gratz, University of
Michigan's College of Literature, Science and Arts, utilized an affirmative
action plan in admissions pursuant to which minority applicants received
twenty points, out of a total of one hundred needed to assure admittance.
The Court concluded that the granting of a set number of points to an
applicant failed to pass constitutional muster because that grant "is not
narrowly tailored" to meet the stated interest of achieving diversity.43 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the "importance of considering
each particular applicant as an individual," and concluded that the failure to
insure individualized consideration made the affirmative action plan
overbroad in its reach. 44
40. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
41. Id. at 1561; cf. Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Although the
Court has recognized a legitimate, compelling governmental concern in state universities'
seeking racial diversity in their student bodies for educational purposes, see [Bakke], it has
never extended this approach beyond the academic setting."); Britton v. South Bend Cmty.
Sch. Corp., 775 F.2d 794, 809 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Bakke for the proposition that "[tlhere
is not, however, any doubt that this interest [rectifying past discrimination] is substantial and
important enough to support affirmative action plans.").
42. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2419-20.
43. Id. at 2427-28.
44. Id. at 2428.
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In contrast, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court considered the
University of Michigan's Law School admissions policy that sought to
admit a "'critical mass' of [underrepresented] minority students.., to
'ensure their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the
Law School."' 45 As defined by the school, "critical mass" was a number
sufficient to encourage minority students' participation and to ensure that
46they did not feel isolated or as spokespersons for their race. A five
member majority of the Court subjected the program to "strict scrutiny,"
i.e., was the program narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental
interests, and concluded that the law school's admission policy passed
constitutional muster. 7
As in the medical school under consideration in Bakke, the Grutter
court concluded that the law school had "a compelling interest in attaining
a diverse student body."48 In concluding for the majority that a compelling
interest exists on the part of the law school, Justice O'Connor followed
Justice Powell's Bakke analysis that such an interest is grounded in the
First Amendment.4 9 However, the basis of this interest is the "educational
benefits that diversity is designed to produce."50 Such benefits include
"cross-racial understanding," the breaking down of stereotypes, and better
preparation "for an increasingly diverse workforce and society."'"
The Court identified a number of interests that are met by the law
school's program. These interests can be roughly divided into two
categories: (1) those interests that relate to the quality of the education
provided by the school; and (2) those interests that contribute to society by
educating a diverse population.
Turning to the initial group of interests, the Court first identified the
interest of "major American business" that have needs for employees with
skills "developed through exposure" to diversity in order to compete in the
global marketplace.52 Following American business is the interest of the
United States military that requires a "highly qualified, racially diverse
officer corps" in order to provide national security.53
This first group of interests seems closely tied to the Bakke analysis.
With these interests, the focus is on the quality of the education. The
underlying premise being that students, both minority and non-minority,
who have experienced a diverse education will have a better education.
45. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332.
46. Id. at 2333-34.
47. Id. at 2337-38.
48. Id. at 2339.
49. See id. at 2339.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2340.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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This premise goes to the heart of Justice Powell's concern in Bakke over
academic freedom. In order to achieve the highest level of education, those
responsible for educating should determine who will be taught and how
they will be taught.54 Had the Court rested on the interests found in this
first group alone, it could be said that Grutter simply restates and reaffirms
Bakke.
The interests identified in the second group, however, go well beyond
Bakke's rationale. The interests addressed in the second category are
concerned with meeting societal- goals, not accommodating academic
freedom. The Court notes that providing education to a diverse population
sustains the country's "political and cultural heritage."55 In addition, the
Court states that education is the "very foundation of good citizenship ....
Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the
civic life of our Nation is essential .... Finally, the law school's
program is justified "[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy
in the eyes of the citizenry, [because] it is necessary that the path to
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity. 57
In contrast to the first group of interests, those interests identified in
the second group do not focus on the quality of the education. Indeed, the
interests in the second group focus almost exclusively on matters that are
far removed from the academic setting. In contrast to Bakke, the interests
incorporated in the second group are not related to the choices a school
makes concerning who to teach or how to teach them. The preeminent
concern in this second group is the benefit received by society by providing
an education to a diverse population. These interests are not grounded in
concerns over academic freedom or the First Amendment.
IV. THE POTENTIAL EFFECT ON EMPLOYMENT
Certainly, the Taxman rationale for distinguishing higher education
cases from those involving Title VII has been considerably undermined by
the reasoning set forth by Grutter. By moving affirmative action in higher
education admissions away from the First Amendment/academic freedom
54. See id. at 2339 ("Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a
degree of deference to a university's academic decisions"); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) ("It is the business of a university to
provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.
It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential academic freedoms' of a
university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.").
55. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).
56. Id. at 2340-41.
57. Id. at 2341.
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underpinnings of Bakke to encompass broader societal considerations, the
Court has raised the question of whether these other considerations may
justify affirmative action in other contexts, such as employment. Indeed,
the Seventh Circuit has already concluded that the Grutter analysis applies
18to hiring in public employment. In Petit v. City of Chicago, that court
concluded, in reliance on Grutter, that Chicago police executives, when
considering the need of a police force, should be given the same deference
when making determinations concerning police operations as universities
are given when they make academic determinations. 9 Then, echoing the
Grutter court's second category of interests, the court held that the Chicago
Police Department "had a compelling interest in a diverse population at the
rank of sergeant in order to set the proper tone in the department and to
earn the trust of the community .... "60
Robert Post argues that there is a tension between the Court's holding
in Grutter, which he maintains resembles the role model theory, and the
Court's prior decision in Wygant.61 As discussed above, Wygant rejected
the "role model" theory as a compelling government interest warranting
affirmative action. Grutter, however, should not be read to espouse a
theory of role modeling. Under the role model theory, minority teachers
62provide minority role models for minority students to emulate. Grutter's
rationale does not argue for diversity simply for the so-called betterment of
minority students. Rather, Grutter focuses on the improvement made to
education for all students by providing diversity (the category one
interests), and the societal good achieved by having students educated in a
diverse environment (the category two interests). In this regard, the closest
Grutter comes to arguing in favor of the role model theory is: "In order to
cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. 63  But here, the good
realized is the legitimacy of societal leadership, not models for minority
students to follow.64
58. 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25221 (7th Cir. Dec. 15, 2003).
59. See id. at *8. Justice Scalia has voiced his view that Grutter could be seen as
signaling "a new willingness to rely upon good faith" determinations of a compelling
interest instead of insisting upon a "strong basis in evidence." Concrete Works of Colo. v.
Denver, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8547 (Nov. 17, 2003). The Petit decision seems to support that
view.
60. Id. at*11.
61. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term: Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 62, n.286 (2003).
62. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
63. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
64. Grutter and Wygant do clearly diverge on the issue of the importance of prior
discrimination to the analysis. Grutter apparently jettisons past discrimination as a
necessary element to the justification of an affirmative action plan, where in Wygant it was a
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It is precisely because Grutter did not adopt the role model theory that
it has had an almost immediate effect on public employment. The outcome
in Petit depends upon the government's ability to demonstrate a compelling
need to achieve a specific public good. Under Grutter, the Seventh Circuit
had little trouble concluding that improving the relationship between the
police and the citizens they interacted with met this standard. Had Grutter
simply reversed Wygant and adopted the role model theory, the outcome in
Petit would almost certainly have been different: the sergeants in Petit were
not selected to act as role models.
Having already influenced the hiring of municipal police, it would not
be surprising to see the Grutter decision affect other areas of public
employment. The interests of the military, which figured prominently in
the decision, would seem to meet the criteria for utilizing an affirmative
action plan. Other federal, state, and local agencies would meet the criteria
for much the same reasons as the police and military do. Public colleges
and universities would also seem to meet the criteria-a strong argument
can be made that a diverse faculty contributes to robust classroom
65discussion at least as much as a diverse student body.
It is more difficult to discern Grutter's potential effect on private
employment. Bakke's most notable impact on the law relating to private
employment was in the Supreme Court's approach to determining whether
the rights of the majority had been infringed. Bakke set the precedent that
in particular circumstances race could be used as part of a decision making
process without violating the Equal Protection Clause. This rationale was
mirrored by the Court in both Weber and Johnson. Bakke's Equal
Protection Clause analysis of whether a classification is "precisely
tailored ' 66 became the model for Title VII's analysis of whether an
affirmative action plan "unnecessarily trammels" the rights of the
61majority. If the doctrinal development of Grutter follows the same path
as Bakke, we should expect to see a greater emphasis on individualized
determinations and decision making, particularly in light of the holding in
Gratz.
68
Bakke had little effect on the acceptable reasons for which a private
employer could adopt an affirmative action plan. In this regard, the
doctrinal differences between Bakke's grounding in the Equal Protection
necessary element of the plan. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275 (noting the "Court's focus on
prior discrimination as the justification for, and limitation on, a State's adoption of race-
based remedies.").
65. As noted above in the discussion of Wygant, Justice O'Connor has already indicated
that she would entertain such an argument. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 n*.
66. Bakke, 428 U.S. at 299.
67. See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
68. Cf Post, supra note 61, at 69 (highlighting the importance of the individualized
assessment in the Grutter analysis and tracing the roots of this requirement to Bakke).
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Clause analysis and the Supreme Court's Title VII analysis kept Bakke
distinct. Specifically, the Equal Protection Clause permits the government
to act whenever it discerns a compelling need. Under Title VII, an
employer may only act to redress past discrimination or a manifest
imbalance in its work force.
Since Weber, the analysis of affirmative action undertaken by private
employers has been linked to the remediation of past discrimination, either
by society or the employer. Weber addressed a "manifest racial
imbalance." 69 The Johnson Court approved the affirmative action plan
before it because it addressed historic discrimination.7 ° At least one court
of appeals has concluded that in order to comply with Title VII, an
affirmative action plan adopted by a private employer is required, "by
controlling precedent," to have a remedial purpose.7 The Grutter opinion
does not address the past discrimination requirement of Wygant because it
relies on Bakke and the First Amendment as its starting point.
At first blush, Grutter's influence on affirmative action in private
employment may be limited. Neither of Grutter's categories of interests
justifying affirmative action, those related to the quality of education or
those related to societal improvement, fit within the Title VII analysis.
Neither category relates to either past discrimination or the current
72majority/minority distribution in a population.
However, Grutter may eventually have an effect on the required
prerequisites to an affirmative action plan in private employment because
Grutter, and now Petit, create an underlying conflict in accepted Equal
69. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
70. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631.
71. Schurr v. Resorts Int'l, 196 F.3d 486, 497 (3rd Cir. 1999).
72. This raises the question of whether the Grutter analysis has a definable limit on the
use of affirmative action programs in employment. Such a limit may be found in the
underlying premise of Grutter. Diversity is a compelling government interest in admissions
because it improves the quality of the education provided. This rationale reflects two pre-
existing tests already incorporated into Title VII, both of which examine the business need
for the criteria selected by the employer. The first concerns bona fide occupational
qualifications ("BFOQ"). See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(e) (2004). Under the BFOQ provision,
an employer is permitted to use certain protected classes as an employment qualification if
the qualification is inter alia, "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise." Id.; see also Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400
(1985) (adopting a uniform approach to the BFOQ provisions of Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); cf. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 203
(1991) (noting that a BFOQ defense must relate to the "central mission" of the enterprise).
Similarly, in disparate impact cases an employer may defend, in part, a neutral practice that
adversely affects a protected class if the practice is "job related" "and "consistent with
business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2004). Under this analysis, Grutter
would permit an employer to use "diversity" as an employment criteria where the employer
can demonstrate that diversity is reasonably necessary to provide its product or service. Cf.
Petit v. City of Chicago, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25221 (7th Cir. Dec. 15, 2003).
GRUTTER
Protection Clause/Title VII doctrine. The Equal Protection Clause has
traditionally been interpreted as imposing greater constraints than Title VII
on employers. As noted by the Johnson Court: "The fact that a public
employer must also satisfy the Constitution does not negate the fact that the
statutory prohibition with which that employer must contend was not
intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution. 7 3 Similarly, central to
the holding of Weber was that the case did "not present an alleged violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9
74
Accordingly, the Court was free to conclude that "Title VII... was not
intended to incorporate or particularize the commands of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.""
As highlighted by the affirmative action plan approved in Petit, we are
now left in the somewhat paradoxical situation of the Equal Protection
Clause imposing fewer restraints on the government than Title VII imposes
on private employers. Under current law, a private employer would not be
permitted to adopt an affirmative action plan to better community relations,
or referring more directly back to Grutter, to sustain the "political and
cultural heritage," insure "[e]ffective participation by members of all racial
and ethnic groups in ... civic life," train "our Nation's leaders," or "to
,,76cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy. Grutter's ultimate effect on
private employers depends on the manner in which the courts resolve this
conflict.
V. CONCLUSION
There is some basis to believe that the conflict between Title VII and
the Equal Protection Clause created by Grutter and Petit will be resolved
by modifying the Title VII analysis to conform to Grutter. Justice
O'Connor, who wrote the Grutter opinion for the Court, has previously
indicated that in her view the Equal Protection Clause analysis and the Title
VII analysis should be the same. In her concurrence in Johnson, she stated:
"In my view, the proper initial inquiry in evaluating the legality of an
affirmative action plan by a public employer under Title VII is no different
from that required by the Equal Protection Clause. 77 If the tension created
by Grutter between the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII is resolved in
the manner argued for by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence, there may
73. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 n.6 (emphasis in original).
74. Weber, 443 U.S. at 200; see also id. at 201 (emphasizing "the significance of the
fact that the.., plan is an affirmative action plan voluntarily adopted by private parties ...
.11).
75. Id. at 206 n.6.
76. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
77. Johnson. 480 U.S. at 648.
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an increase in the use of affirmative action plans by private employers.
Incorporating the Grutter approach into the Title VII analysis would
permit a private employer to adopt an affirmative action plan if it was able
to establish that the affirmative action plan yielded the same or similar
societal good as the affirmative action plan utilized by the University of
Michigan Law School. Institutions of higher education seeking to hire
professors and lecturers would logically have the first claim to such a plan.
As noted above with regard to public universities, it is only a small leap
from Grutter to conclude that diversity among the faculty creates the same
beneficial effect on education (the category one interests), and yields the
same societal good embodied in the category two interests, that diversity
among the student body creates. Any private employer that competes "in
today's increasingly global marketplace" may have a legitimate claim to
needing an affirmative action plan under the Grutter rationale.78 Grutter
signals this potential by listing the interests of "major American
businesses" as the first benefit of a diverse student population.
On the other hand, the conflict between the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VII may also be resolved by reducing the breadth and scope of
the Grutter analysis. There is, perhaps, some doubt as to the long term
vitality of the Grutter holding. Justice Powell's analysis in Bakke created
symmetrical constitutional interests: the majority's right to Equal
Protection Clause balanced against the medical school's First Amendment
right to academic freedom.7 9 The second category of interests adopted by
Grutter, those interests addressing societal good, lacks this symmetry. The
second category interests are not firmly grounded in a constitutional right,
but rather the perceived betterment of society as a whole. Without a
constitutional (or even statutory) base, the relevance of these interests to
the Title VII analysis of the affirmative action plans of private employers
may be in doubt.
The experience under Bakke demonstrates that changes in the law of
affirmative action in admissions to public colleges and universities can
have a significant ripple effect on affirmative action plans in employment,
both public and private. Gratz and Grutter will clearly focus the
affirmative action analysis on individualized decision making. However, it
is still too soon to tell whether Grutter is a watershed for affirmative action
in employment. Grutter's analysis is not as tightly tied to academia as the
Bakke analysis. Therefore, there is greater potential for Grutter to have an
impact on the circumstances under which an affirmative action plan may be
adopted by employers outside of academia.
The conflict created by Grutter between its interpretation of the Equal
78. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
79. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (noting the medical school's "countervailing constitutional
interest").
2004] GRUTTER 465
Protection Clause and the existing doctrinal parameters of the Title VII
analysis of affirmative action plans must be resolved before the true effect
of Grutter on private employers can be known. In the meantime, as
demonstrated by Petit, the contours of the Grutter decision will be shaped
by public employers.
